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Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative 
Simultaneous Equations Approach 
Robert S. Erikson 
University of Houston 
Thomas R. Palfrey 
California Institute of Technology 
This paper estimates the effects of incumbent spending and challenger spending in U.S. House elec-
tions in the 1970s and 1980s. The paper employs FIML simultaneous equations analysis involving 
instrumental variables as vote predictors, and zero-covariance restrictions for the vote-spending dis-
turbances. This procedure allows the estimation of spending effects given plausible assumptions 
about the effects of unobserved causes of the vote on candidate spending. The results are that in-
cumbent spending matters even with only modest amounts of simultaneity. Evidence is presented to 
suggest that the effectiveness of new incumbent spending declines with seniority but accumulates to 
the incumbent's long-term advantage. 
Introduction 
Common wisdom is that money is a major contributor to the electoral success 
of incumbents in U.S. House elections. The argument goes roughly like this. 
Candidates must spend lavishly to win over congressional voters. Hustling the 
necessary cash from contributors in return for access, incumbents generally are 
able to outspend any challenger who might threaten them. Thus, they almost al-
ways win reelection. Aware that incumbents are protected by their cash 
advantage, potential opponents rarely offer more than token challenges. The 
process perpetuates a system whereby most congressional races are not seriously 
contested. 
Although the foregoing argument has a familiar resonance, it is by no means 
the conclusion one reaches from reading most empirical studies by political sci-
ence journals. As Jacobson first showed with his pioneering work (1978, 1980, 
1985), OLS regressions of the district vote present the odd result that while chal-
lenger spending matters, the coefficient for incumbent spending is always near 
zero and sometimes even with the wrong sign, due to simultaneity problems. 
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Subsequent efforts to correct for this using instrumental variables (Bartels 1992; 
Green and Krasno 1988) have not been entirely satisfactory. The most generous 
instrumental variable estimates of incumbent spending effects are considerably 
smaller than those for challenger spending, and arguably biased upward to boot 
(Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1990). If the relative spending advantage goes to 
challengers rather than incumbents, then incumbents' advantage from free re-
sources must be considerably greater than recognized. According to the 
incumbency literature (e.g., Alford and Brady 1993; Erikson 1972; Gelman and 
King 1990), incumbents gain five or more percentage points (on average) just for 
being incumbents. If incumbents must overcome a disadvantage in terms of 
spending effects, then the incumbency advantage from other sources becomes 
even more impressive, and mysterious in its origins, than previously thought. 
The real question then is, How much (if any) of the incumbency advantage is 
attributable to spending differentials? To answer this, we look at the net spend-
ing advantage for the incumbent or challenger in terms of the following identity: 
Net spending advantage= JJlIE) + fic(CE) 
where the net spending advantage is measured in units of incumbent vote 
share,fi1 andfie represent coefficients for incumbent vote increments gained 
per unit of spending, and IE and CE represent expenditure units (such as 
dollars spent). 
The net advantage depends on both the effect coefficients and the gross ex-
penditures, so that a lesser efficiency at converting dollars to votes can be offset 
by outspending one's opponent. For instance, the net spending advantage would 
be zero when: 
IE _/}s_ 
CE - fi1 
For example, suppose the spending effects themselves were actually equal for 
incumbents and challengers (j31 =-fie). Then, incumbents would enjoy a spend-
ing advantage from the fact that they outspend their challengers. Consider even 
the possibility that incumbents might spend more effectively than their chal-
lengers (j31 > -fie). Incumbents would gain both from spending more and 
spending more effectively. The result would be an incumbent spending advantage 
sufficiently large to account for much if not all of the overall advantage of 
incumbency. 
Thus we raise the possibility that the popular (as opposed to political science) 
view of the incumbency advantage is correct in at least its more important re-
spects. With parity of incumbent and challenger spending coefficients, the net 
spending advantage goes to the higher-spending incumbents. If incumbents 
spend even slightly more effectively than their often amateurish challenger op-
ponents, money would be a major source of the overall incumbency advantage. 
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Of course, this sort of speculation faces one key obstacle: the pervasive finding 
in the literature on spending effects that Jh is dwarfed by f3c-
The present paper reexamines the statistical evidence regarding the relative ef-
fects of incumbent and challenger spending on the vote. We find that incumbent 
spending is of considerable importance in House elections and a major source of 
the incumbency advantage. The reason why such evidence has been elusive in 
earlier studies, we argue, is that the statistical strength of the reverse effect of 
close elections on spending has been seriously underestimated. Our paper offers 
four innovative features. 
"UNCORRELATED ERRORS" METHODOLOGY. Statistically, we present a new way to 
identify the vote model by making assumptions about the covariances of the 
error terms. This permits estimation of spending effects in the presence of si-
multaneity that arises because the level of spending depends on candidates' 
expectations about how close the election will be. We then extend this model to 
estimate the severity of the simultaneity problem. 
CONDITIONING SPENDING EFFECTS ON SENIORITY. We separately analyze spending 
effects for different seniority levels, and find large differences, especially be-
tween freshmen and veterans. Spending effects are of special interest for 
freshman members of Congress, as past studies have shown it is in the first re-
election that House members gain the lion's share of their incumbency 
advantage. Our results shed some light on why this is so. We estimate the 
buildup of an incumbency advantage using a cumulative model of spending ef-
fects, and show that this closely tracks the actual time profile of the incumbency 
advantage. 
TWO-DECADE TIME FRAME. We analyze congressional district election results over 
two decades, from 1972 to 1990, pooling this data into one massive dataset. 
DISTRICT-LEVEL "PAR." As an innovation, using data from open seat elections we 
estimate district-level partisanship from district presidential voting. Par is an in-
cumbency-neutral and spending-neutral estimate of the combination of the 
normal vote and short-term forces (or year effects). 
Open Seats: Spending Effects and the Measurement of Par 
The analysis begins with an investigation of spending effects for open seats-
those with no incumbent running. We start there for two reasons. First, since 
effects of spending for open seats should be about equal for both Republican and 
Democratic candidates (neither is the incumbent), open seats should provide un-
biased estimates of the potential effect parameters for challengers and 
incumbents in incumbent races. Second, we exploit our open seat analysis to 
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obtain estimates of a baseline we call "Par." Par is the expected vote independent 
of candidate considerations-given district partisanship ("normal vote"), the 
election year's partisan trend ("national short term forces"), no incumbent can-
didate, and equal (canceling) Republican and Democratic spending effects. 
As a reflector of district partisanship, the district-level presidential vote is the 
major component of Par. For the 1970s, the one presidential vote measure that 
predicts the congressional vote well, regardless of election year, is the Carter-
Ford 1976 vote. For the 1980s, the Dukakis-Bush 1988 vote serves this purpose. 1 
Par represents a particular baseline: the expected congressional vote, given 
the district's relevant presidential voting history and the election-year partisan 
trend, for an open seat where Democratic and Republican spending levels are 
balanced. Table 1 shows how this was done. For open seats of the 1970s, the 
first column shows a regression of the percent Democratic vote on the Carter 
1976 percentage, four election-year dummies, and the net difference between 
the log of Democratic spending and the log of Republican spending. To adjust 
for regional differences, a "south" dummy and a "south" x presidential vote in-
teraction term were also added. As shown in column 2, this procedure was 
replicated for the 1980s using the 1988 presidential vote as the district parti-
sanship measure. The third column shows the pooled estimates, using a 
common estimate of spending effects. The boxed portion of column 3 is the 
measure of Par. Par is the open seat equation prediction, with the estimated ef-
fect of spending subtracted from it.2 
Note that the spending effect is modeled as a linear effect of logged spending 
on the two-party vote division. This specification allows the marginal effect of 
the next dollar to diminish with the amount already spent. By the usual criteria 
of best-fitting R-squared, lower standard error of estimate, etc., logged spending 
vastly outperforms raw spending as a vote predictor. To maintain a comparable 
monetary scale for different election years, we measure spending in terms of 
constant (1978) dollars. To avoid problems with several cases of "no spending" 
(the log of zero is minus infinity), we adopt Green and Krasno's (1988) conven-
tion, measuring the spending variable as the log of the candidate's spending plus 
$5,000 (in 1978 dollars). 
1The presidential vote for other election years (1972, 1980 for the 1970s; 1984 for the 1980s) does 
not add significantly to the prediction of the open seat vote within the decade. For the 1980s, the 
1984 presidential vote could be substituted for the 1988 vote. The two vote measures correlate at 
+.97. 
2Some side evidence suggests that Par is a very accurate reflection of cross-district differences in 
partisanship. For example, with Par in the equation, the lagged (T- 2 years) congressional vote does 
not even make a statistically significant contribution to the open seat vote. That is, if one knows the 
presidential vote (for 1976 for the 1970s; 1988 for the 1980s) plus the election year and region, the 
district's congressional election history does not help to predict the open seat congressional vote. Ev-
idently, most relevant information about district partisanship is contained in Par. If Par were a leaky 
measure of district partisanship, partisanship would be reflected by the district's congressional elec-
tion history. 
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TABLE 1 
Predicting the Open Seat Vote, 1972-1990 
Open Variance = Percent Dem. 1972-80 1982-90 1972-90 
Log Democrat spending 4.33 5.08 4.70 
- log Republican spending (8.32) (9.89) (12.80) 
Democrat presidential vote, 0.74 0.47 0.71 
1976 or 1988 (11.58) (6.83) (12.54) 
South dummy 15.90 6.38 15.52 
(2.44) ( 1.08) (2.42) 
South x Democrat presidential vote -0.33 -0.06 -0.32 
(-2.76) (-0.43) (-2.73) 
South x Decade 1980s -8.81 
(-1.00) 
Decade 1980s x -0.21 
Democrat Presidential Vote (-2.86) 
South x Decade 1980s 0.26 
x Democrat Presidential Vote (1.42) 
Year 
1974 6.23 6.14 
(4.74) (4.47) 
1976 6.33 6.21 
(4.54) (4.52) 
1978 1.65 1.68 
( 1.21) (1.24) 




1984 -4.73 11.38 
(-2.82) (2.99) 
1986 -2.29 11.73 
(-1.54) (3.69) 
1988 -4.47 11.68 
(-2.67) (3.04) 
1990 -1.04 15.18 
(-0.63) (4.09) 
Constant 12.45 31.55 13.82 
(3.82) (8.88) (4.72) 
Adjusted R2 .739 .749 .739 
Standard error of est. 6.76 6.55 6.68 
Number of Cases (241) (163) (404) 
Note: Log of Democrat Spending, Log of Republican Spending = Natural Log of Candidate 
Spending plus $5,000, all in constant ( 1978) dollars. 
I-values in parentheses 
Par = Boxed Component 
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Not to be lost in the shuffle of our discussion of Par are the estimated effects 
of spending by open seat candidates. Spending coefficients are quite significant 
statistically for both Republican and Democratic candidates. For the measure-
ment of Par, we simply utilize the net difference in logged spending between the 
two parties. 
The Uncorrelated Errors Solution 
In this section, we present our methodology, utilizing a zero-covariance re-
striction for the disturbance terms or, simply, "uncorrelated errors." The zero 
covariance refers to the assumed lack of correlation across selected residuals in 
the structural equations. This permits identification of the three-equation system 
presented below. 
The three estimated equations, omitting the constant terms, are: 
IE= f311 (JV) + f312(T) + E1 
CE= f321(JV) + f322(T) + Ez 
IV= f331(JE) + f332(CE) + f33J(Par) + f33iLNV) + f33 5(T) + E3 
where cov(Ei, E3) = cov(E2, E3) = 0 and: 
IV= incumbent's percent of two-part vote 
IE= Log oflncumbent Spending plus $5000 (1978 dollars) 
CE = Log of Challenger Spending plus $5000 (1978 dollars) 
Par = expected vote from district presidential vote plus year effects 
LNV = incumbent's Lagged Net Vote (vote minus Par) from the previous 
election 
T = time, in years 
As an estimate of the expected vote absent candidate effects, Par allows us to 
pool data across years. As the deviation from Par in the previous election, the 
Lagged Net Vote reflects the incumbent's previous vote. The Lagged Net Vote 
represents the combination of the incumbent's and the challenger's personal vote 
in the previous election, including that portion due to spending effects.3 
Time is included in our equations as a control. It is well known that over time, 
incumbents increasingly spend more in real terms, independent of electoral mar-
ginality. To the extent the incumbency advantage has increased, it is important to 
sort out money versus other sources represented by time as the contributing 
causes.4 
3This model does not imply that candidates observe the vote outcome exactly. Candidates spend in 
response to their personal expectations of the incumbent vote. These expectations are linear functions 
of the actual vote but with random error. Below, however, we modify this assumption. 
4We do not include the challenger's prior office as a quality proxy in this analysis on the grounds 
that this variable is endogenous. Inclusion, however, does not affect the results in any significant way. 
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There are two standard approaches to identifying a system of equations such as 
this, in order to estimate its structural parameters. This first is to employ exclusion 
restrictions, in which certain exogenous variables are assumed to enter some of 
the equations, but are excluded from the other equations (i.e., the coefficients 
in the equations where they are "excluded" are assumed to be exactly equal to 0). 
The second approach is to impose restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix 
of the residuals. 
Previous work in the context of the vote/spending equations has applied only 
the exclusion approach, and has done so in the following way. To obtain the nec-
essary identifying exclusion restrictions, a series of assumptions are made in 
order to identify the coefficients. First, the second equation is assumed not to 
exist-that is, challenger spending is considered an exogenous variable. In the 
context of our notation, the assumption is thatfi21 = 0 and fi22 = 0. Second, iden-
tification is finally accomplished by employing an instrument for IE-for 
instance, lagged values of IE. The resulting system of two equations is then esti-
mated by TSLS. 
There are several shortcomings of applying this instrumental variables ap-
proach to the vote/spending problem, of which we briefly mention two. First, and 
perhaps most obvious, is that challenger spending is endogenous, for many of 
the same reasons that incumbent spending is endogenous. The challenger and in-
cumbent are involved in a spending game, and their equilibrium levels of 
spending are codetermined. To simply throw out one of the equations of a three-
equation system is not a reasonab.le solution. However, this is mainly what has 
been done because there simply aren't any good instruments for challenger 
spending. 5 
This lack of a decent instrument for challenger spending brings up the second 
shortcoming: there aren't very good instruments for incumbent spending either! 
Thus, what really limits the usefulness of instrumental variables here is the com-
mon problem of nonexistence of good instruments for any of the endogenous 
variables. Finding plausible instruments for the spending variables poses an ex-
tremely difficult challenge. 
Here is what has been tried in the past. In his TSLS analysis, Jacobson (1978, 
1980, 1985) relied on the presence of a primary challenge as the chief instru-
ment for incumbent spending, and found no appreciable spending effect. Note, 
however, that Jacobson's null findings rest on the fact that incumbents who sur-
vive primary challenges (spending more in the process) show no exceptional 
success in the general election. This is a shaky foundation, considering that po-
tential primary challengers are more likely to run against incumbents who show 
signs of electoral weakness. 
5Jacobson (1978) tried a measure of challenger quality (whether the challenger had been elected 
to prior office) as an instrument for challenger spending. However, this specification ignores the in-
dependent effect of challenger quality on the vote. 
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Green and Krasno (1988, 1990) obtained estimates of stronger incumbent 
spending ·effects using a different instrument, namely the lagged value of in-
cumbent spending. The argument is that prior spending only represents the 
incumbent's "taste" for spending unaffected by current electoral forces, and thus 
has no direct effect on the current vote. But, as pointed out by Abramowitz 
(1991) and Jacobson (1990), Green and Krasno 's assumptions ignore regression 
to the mean. Abramowitz's and Jacobson's counterargument can be stated as fol-
lows: incumbents spend more in response to strong challenges that lower their 
vote (in Year T - 2). If the challenge is survived, the incumbent's vote in the next 
election (Year T) reverts to normal. Thus, heavy incumbent spending predicts 
electoral improvement in the subsequent election, or the Green-Krasno finding. 
Crucially, this is a result that would obtain even if the null hypothesis (}331 == 0) 
were true, so long as incumbent spending responds to an effective challenge 
(f311 < 0). 
In light of the various critiques of these prior estimates, the instruments seem 
sufficiently dubious to make the estimates of incumbent spending effects highly 
suspect. Yet, we know that the null findings of OLS estimates are certainly 
worthless due to simultaneity bias. If so, statistically we know nothing about the 
true effects of incumbent spending. The result would appear to be a statistical 
impasse, were there no alternative route to identification. 6 
This leaves covariance restrictions as the natural direction to turn, and here is 
where the uncorrelated errors assumption provides the needed leverage. 7 Applied 
to our problem, the maintained hypothesis is that the disturbance terms for the 
incumbent spending equation and the challenger spending equation are each un-
correlated with the disturbance term for the vote share equation-in other words, 
that there are no unmeasured sources of spurious correlation between either IE 
or CE spending and the vote. The fact that spending is a function of the antici-
pated or expected vote is turned from a research handicap to a source of 
analytical leverage. While every variable that affects the vote is a likely cause of 
spending levels, the effect on spending presumably is indirect via the vote. 
6Indicative of the need for a fresh approach, others have been reexamining the statistical evidence 
in a variety of ways. Kenny and McBurnette (1994) apply a unique multiequation approach involv-
ing survey responses (although ignoring simultaneity). Goidel and Gross (1994) apply three-stage 
least squares to a model similar to Green and Krasno's. Both papers claim evidence of a significant 
and appreciable incumbency effect. In another paper, Levitt (1994) controls for candidate effects by 
analyzing, via OLS, pairs of elections where the same two candidates compete. He estimates spend-
ing effects an order of magnitude lower than previous studies, with insignificant incumbent spending 
effects. 
7The solution of identification via zero covariance among disturbance terms of endogenous vari-
ables is discussed in advanced treatments of the identification problem (e.g., Fisher 1966, chaps. 3-4; 
Rothenberg 1973, chaps. 4-5; Goldberger I 991, 361-62; Johnston 1963, 248-49; Maddala 1977, 
226-28; Malinvaud 1966, 528-38; see also Heise 1975, 181-82; Hanushek and Jackson 1977, 
271-76.) For a general discussion, see Hausman and Taylor (1983) and Hausman, Newey, and 
Taylor (I 987). For a political science application, see Erikson I 982. 
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Meanwhile, unmeasured variables that might affect spending directly are not 
likely to affect the vote directly. 
The basic idea for why this provides the necessary identification is simple in 
its intuition. Because the residual vote is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
spending disturbances, the (standardized) correlation or (unstandardized) covari-
ances between the spending variables and the vote are assumed to be a function 
only of the two reciprocal effects of spending on votes and votes on spending. 
Simplifying slightly, the covariance between each spending variable and the in-
cumbent vote is, roughly, the sum of the two effects: of votes on spending and of 
spending on votes. Since the effects of the incumbent vote on the two spending 
variables are readily estimated via TSLS, the effects of spending on the vote are 
estimated (approximately) by subtracting the vote-on-spending coefficients from 
their respective covariances. If incumbent spending positively affects votes, for 
example, then the covariance between incumbent spending and the incumbent 
vote should be more positive than the estimated coefficient for the effect of the 
incumbent vote on incumbent spending. A positive residual would represent a 
positive spending effect. 
Note that the uncorrelated errors assumption applies to the covariances between 
the vote and each spending variable, but not between the two spending variables. 
The model is identified even though it is totally agnostic regarding the reasons 
why incumbent spending and challenger spending correlate. District demograph-
ics and the nature of the local media market(s), for example, can affect both 
spending variables. Spending by one candidate may affect the spending level of 
the opponent, apart from an indirect effect via the expected vote. Our model al-
lows for this, if we assume some of the vote-on-spending effect is indirect via 
opponent spending. For instance, a tight race may cause the challenger to spend, 
which directly causes the incumbent to spend. Ifwe specify any arbitrary nonzero 
effects of IE and CE on each other a priori, the direct effects of the vote on spend-
ing are affected accordingly. But the estimated effects of the spending variables on 
the vote remain unaffected by the choice of specification of assumed cross-
spending effects. All that is required to drive the model is that the sources of the 
spending-vote correlations are a combination of indirect and direct vote-on-
spending effects plus (presumably direct) spending-on-vote effects. 
Estimated Spending Effects 
Table 2 presents our estimates of the vote equation, including spending ef-
fects, while Table 3 presents the companion spending equations.8 The system of 
8The data span two decades of congressional elections in the period 1972-90. We include only 
cases where the current incumbent had been a candidate in the previous election and faced major-
party opposition-that is, we exclude all elections following bielections and all elections where the 
incumbent had been unopposed the election before. With still other elections excluded because of re-
districting or special circumstances, we have 1,945 veteran cases and 424 freshman cases. 
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TABLE 2 
Estimated Effects of Campaign Spending, 1974-1990: 
Comparison of Models 
Veteran House Members Freshmen House Members 
OLS Uncorrelated Errors OLS Uncorrelated Errors 
A= o A= I A1= .39 A= o A= I A1= .39 
Ac= .28 Ac= .28 
Incumbent 0.20 3.32 1.57 1.16 10.58 4.52 
spending (0.86) (7.77) (2.12) ( 1.65) (5.00) (2.64) 
Challenger -3.68 -0.45 -2.97 -4.71 -0.07 -3.99 
spending (-28.50) (-1.71) (-7.25) (-15.90) (-0.08) (-5.32) 
Par 0.64 1.05 0.75 0.50 1.36 0.68 
(27.76) (27.08) (15.58) (8.31) (8.39) (6.99) 
Short-term 0.76 0.75 
forces (12.06) (5.75) 
Lagged net vote 0.35 0.64 0.45 0.24 0.86 0.41 
(18.23) (22.61) (14.54) (4.49) (7.18) (6.41) 
Time 0.01 -0.22 -0.10 O.o3 -0.71 0.22 
(0.26) (-4.79) (-1.56) (0.40) (-3.86) (1.50) 
Standard error of est. 5.67 7.35 5.83 5.93 10.14 6.25 
Adjusted R2 .67 .64 
Number of cases (1945) (1945) (1945) (432) (432) (432) 
Note: Spending= Log (Total expenditures+ 5,000), all in constant (1978) dollars. 
I-values in parentheses 
In the third and sixth columns, Par excludes short-term forces, and the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors are obtained without constraining A at a fixed predetermined value. The estimates in 
the other columns are obtained by constraining A to equal either 0 or I. 
TABLE 3 
Spending Equations, "Uncorrelated Errors" Estimates 
Veteran House Members Freshmen House Members 
Log Incumbent Log Challenger Log Incumbent Log Challenger 
Spending Spending Spending Spending 
(+$5,000) (+$5,000) (+$5,000) (+$5,000) 
Incumbent vote margin -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.12 
(-21.61) (-33.78) (-11.94) (-17.48) 
Time 0.08 -0.00 0.08 -0.02 
(28.54) (-0.35) (14.89) (2.00) 
Standard error of est. .384 .812 .510 .874 
Note: Log of Spending = Natural Log of Candidate Spending + $5,000, in constant ( 1978) dollars. 
t -values in parentheses 
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equations is estimated separately for veteran and for freshman incumbents. For 
comparative purposes, the first and fourth columns of Table 2 present the erro-
neous OLS estimates of the vote equations. As in past studies, we find 
asymmetrical "effects" with highly "significant" coefficients for challenger 
spending but virtually no effect for incumbent spending. Even for the newly ar-
rived freshmen, enjoying their sophomore surge, the OLS equations imply that 
only challenger money matters. It is by now widely accepted that this is not the 
correct result. 
The second and fifth columns show our new uncorrelated errors estimates.9 
Here we have the reversal of the OLS results. For veteran incumbent races, in-
cumbent spending affects the vote with a statistically significant coefficient of 
3.3; challenger spending affects the vote only weakly with a statistically in-
significant coefficient of -0.5. For freshman races, the results are even more 
asymmetrical, with a coefficient in double digits for incumbents but virtually 
zero for challengers. 
Meanwhile, from Table 3 we see that the (anticipated) vote has a powerful in-
fluence on spending by incumbents (whether veterans or freshmen) and especially 
by challengers. The substantively important effects of spending on the vote are al-
most drowned by the stronger flow from anticipated vote to spending. This would 
account for the disparity between the uncorrelated errors and OLS findings as do 
a massive pair of vote-on-spending effects. But this leaves us with a new puzzle to 
explain, namely that the above specification of the simultaneous equations model 
somehow "overadjusts" for the simultaneity between spending and the vote, so 
that now it appears as if challenger spending has only a very small effect. 
This apparent puzzle has a simple resolution. Recall that the motivation for 
the spending equations is that candidates' spending decisions respond to the an-
ticipated vote-i.e., their expectations about how close the election will be. In 
elections where both candidates expect the incumbent is likely to be in trouble 
(i.e., incumbent vote is expected to be low), both candidates spend more. In the 
simultaneous equations estimates, the "anticipated" vote in the spending equa-
tion, to which candidates are assumed to respond, is the signal of the actual vote, 
perceived with error. In contrast, the OLS model generates spending coefficients 
with the assumption that the signal for the candidates' anticipated vote is limited 
to the variable in our vote equation. That is, it ignores the fact that the candidates 
themselves may have some additional information about the specific features of 
the election in which they are involved that are not captured in our model. Thus, 
these two estimates represent two extreme assumptions about the correct way to 
measure the candidates' anticipated vote-one (OLS) in which the candidates 
know no more about the specific election they are involved in than what is cap-
tured in our own simple linear vote equation, and the other in which expectations 
9We obtain maximum likelihood estimates using the statistical software EQS. The third and sixth 
columns are explained later in the paper. 
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are further conditioned on the residual error of the vote equation. Clearly the 
truth lies somewhere in between. 
This leads us to the next step of our analysis, which is to estimate the extent 
to which candidates' expectations of the vote are conditioned on intangible (i.e., 
unmeasured) sources of the vote that end up as residual error in our vote equa-
tion. To do this, we expand the model, by introducing a parameter, f.., that 
measures how much spending responds to national short-term forces and to the 
unobserved residual of the vote equation. In other words, when the vote shifts in 
a particular year due either to the local campaign-specific factors or to national 
short-term forces, candidates sense the change equally well (but imperfectly) 
whichever the source, and spending responds accordingly. The parameter mea-
sures the degree of imperfection of these perceptions. 
Formally, we estimate ( aj3, A[, f..c) in the following system of three equations. 
Again we use the restriction that cov(E1, E3) = 0 and cov(E2, E3) = 0 to identify the 
system. 
IE= Cl.1 + J311(IVobs. + f..1IVunobs.) + J312 T + E1 
CE= Cl.2 + J321UVobs. + f..cIVunobs.) + J322T + E2 
IV= Cl.3 + f33ifE + f332CE + f333NV + f334STF + f335LNV + f336T + E3 
= IVobs. + IVunobs 
where 
IVabs. (Directly observed sources of incumbent vote)= IV - IVunobs. 
IVunobs. (Indirectly observed or intangible sources of incumbent vote) 
= f334STF + E3 
STF =National Short-Term Forces (year effects) 
NV (Normal Vote)= Par - STF 
Effectively, what we have done is decompose Par into its two components, 
NV and STF. The NV component of Par, together with LNV, reflects variables 
that are directly observable to the candidates: the pattern of district presidential 
voting, the vote in the previous election, and the prior election's short-term 
forces. These enter into the spending equations as before. Short-term forces and 
the residual of the vote equation are different. While observed ex post facto by 
the analyst, they are not directly observable by candidates at the time and so 
their effect on spending must be discounted to reflect this. At the extremes, 
fully discounting the unobservables would be equivalent to a model with )\ = 0 
(which is the implicit assumption in the OLS estimates), and perfect parity 
would correspond to )\ = 1 (which is the implicit assumption in the uncorre-
lated errors estimates above). 
This specification permits separate estimation of f.. for incumbents and chal-
lengers, which makes sense since a priori one would expect an incumbent to be 
better equipped to perceive these effects than the typical challenger. Also, by 
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pooling the veteran and freshman systems of equations (while allowing all other 
coefficients to vary across the two groups) we can obtain one common set of A 
estimates for freshmen and veterans. These estimates are A1 = .395 (standard 
error= .160) for incumbents and Ac= .278 (standard error= .100) for chal-
lengers. Thus, judged by the relative responsiveness to short-term forces versus 
the measurable fundamentals, both incumbent and challenger spending respond 
to long-term fundamentals considerably more strongly than to the short-term in-
tangibles, with incumbents responding marginally more to the latter than their 
challenger opponents. 
With A estimated in this manner, the freshman vote equation is: 
fv = 4.52 (IE) -3.99 (CE) +0.68 (NV) +0.75 (STF) + 0.41 (LNV) + 0.22 (T) 
(2.64) (-5.32) (6.99) (5.75) (6.41) (1.50) 
The incumbent spending coefficient remains significant and greater than the 
coefficient for challenger spending. For veteran races, incumbent spending now 
has a coefficient about half that for challengers: 
IV= 1.57 (IE) -2.97 (CE) +0.75 (NV) +0.76 (STF) +0.45 (LNV) -0.10 (T) 
(2.12) (-7.25) (+15.58) (+12.06) (+14.54) (-1.56) 
The results above are displayed as the third and sixth columns of Table 2, 
above. The comparisons with both the OLS (restricting A = 0) and the uncorre-
lated errors estimates (restricting A = 1) are striking. Although the spending 
coefficient for veteran incumbents appears only modestly significant, the larger 
standard error is a function of allowing A1 and Ac to be free parameters. When A1 
and Ac are constrained to their estimated .395 and .278 values, incumbent spend-
ing is highly significant (t-value = 6.19), as it is for any reasonable values of A1 
and Ac. 
We briefly summarize the findings of this section. The section began by 
showing that, without a way to identify A in our model, it would be very dif-
ficult to pin down the relative effects of incumbent and challenger spending 
on the vote. At one extreme (A= 0), there is no simultaneity problem (candi-
date expectations of the vote reflect the predicted vote, plus error) and one 
gets the OLS result that incumbent spending has no effect and challenger 
spending is very effective. At the other extreme (A = 1 ), the simultaneity 
problem is full-blown (candidate expectations reflect the actual vote, plus 
error) and one gets the initial uncorrelated result that is exactly opposite. We 
estimate A to be roughly one-third (.395 for incumbents, .278 for challengers), 
yielding a plausible result where both spending effects are important. Break-
ing this down further provides additional insights. In particular, incumbent 
spending appears to matter just as much if not more than challenger spending 
in the crucial freshman election. But the spending of incumbents who have 
achieved veteran status appears to run into diminishing marginal returns, 
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becoming less effective than challengers' spending, just as many congressional 
scholars have conjectured. 10 
Our next task is a finer-grade analysis of spending effects over the course of 
the congressional career. In the next section, we document in detail a clear pat-
tern of diminishing marginal returns from spending over the career. And we are 
able to closely link the accumulation of spending effects over the career to well-
known findings about the time profile of incumbency advantage. 
Spending Effects and Incumbency 
In this section, we return to the question posed at the outset: to what extent 
does incumbent spending account for the incumbency advantage? Clearly, the 
net spending advantage in the crucial freshman race favors the incumbent over 
the challenger. Not only do freshmen candidates outspend their challenger, but 
freshmen spend their money at least as effectively as their opponents. Net spend-
ing effects are also relevant, however, beyond the freshman election. We have 
presented evidence that while incumbent spending definitely appears to matter 
beyond the freshman election, veteran incumbents spend less effectively than 
challengers. We intend to relate this fact to the pattern of vote change over the 
congressional career. Just as the net spending advantage in the freshman election 
can contribute to the sophomore surge, the net spending advantage (incumbent 
versus challenger) should contribute to vote shifts later in the career. 
The simplest way to estimate the incumbency advantage as a function of se-
niority is from the "sophomore surge" or the average (party swing-adjusted) 
vote gain between the first successful election as a nonincumbent (challenger or 
open seat winner) and the second election, in which the incumbent seeks a sec-
ond term. Adjusted for partisan swings by means of Par (Net Vote minus Lagged 
Net Vote), the average sophomore surge in the 1970s and 1980s was 6.4 per-
centage points. Less well known are the patterns of expected vote gains after the 
freshman election. Table 4 presents the mean Par-adjusted vote gain (i.e., mean 
change in the Net Vote) by terms served. Following the second term, the vote 
gain is positive, as if there were a modest "junior jump" after the more familiar 
sophomore surge. Following the third term, the net gain is virtually zero-"se-
nior slump." Then, for all subsequent terms, the mean net vote change is 
negative, averaging a loss of more than 1.0 percentage points per election. Thus, 
for all intents and purposes, incumbents gain their advantage quickly, mainly in 
the sophomore year. Thereafter, their vote appeal is almost stationary, and in 
about the fourth term starts a slow decline. 
10Diminishing marginal returns works for challengers as well. We reestimated spending effects for 
veteran races using our ;\ estimates, this time separately for repeat challengers (N = 259) and for new 
challengers (N = 1,686). Coefficients for repeat and new challengers were -0.59 and -3.15, respec-
tively. Coefficients for their incumbent opponents were a similar 1.52 and 1.30. We thank Steven 
Levitt for his data on repeat challengers. 
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TABLE 4 
Incumbent Vote Gain by Term of Office 
Net Vote 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Year Year Year Year 
Term N T-2 T ~ T-2 T ~ 
1 432 4.3 10.9 6.6 5.9 8.3 2.4 
2 386 11.5 13.0 1.5 7.6 8.2 0.6 
3 319 13.4 13.5 0.1 7.1 8.0 0.9 
4 253 14.1 13.0 -1.1 7.1 8.2 1.1 
5 202 14.2 12.4 -1.8 7.8 7.7 -0.1 
6 174 13.8 12.l -1.8 7.2 8.4 1.2 
7 146 13.8 13.3 -0.5 6.8 7.6 1.8 
8 115 14.0 12.4 -1.6 6.9 7.3 0.4 
9 80 13.6 11.7 -1.9 7.4 8.3 1.1 
10 59 13.l 11.2 -1.9 7.2 8.1 0.9 
>10 211 14.0 12.1 -1.9 7.5 9.3 1.8 
To estimate the contribution of spending to both the surge and decline of in-
cumbent electoral success, we estimate spending effects separately for each of 
the first 10 terms of a congressional career. Table 5 presents the estimates, using 
the .395 and .278 estimates for A.1 and Ac. Challenger spending effects are fairly 
stable over an incumbent's career cycle, but incumbent spending effects drop off 
considerably after the freshman election and then continue a slow erosion. Yet, 
incumbents offset their challengers' advantage in spending effects by continuing 
to outspend their challengers. Part of this is due to the fact that challenger spend-
ing falls off as a function of seniority. Incumbent spending also declines steadily 
with seniority, but somewhat more slowly. The net spending effect [j31(IE) + 
jJc(CE)] becomes noticeably negative, however, after about the fifth term, pri-
marily due to the progressively lower efficacy (j31) of incumbent spending. 
Clearly the pattern of the net spending advantage over the career mirrors the 
pattern of vote change over the career. How perfectly or imperfectly spending 
effects account for the totality of the vote change over the career depends on 
the assumptions we impose regarding the dynamics of the process. Figure 1 
presents the observed change in the Net Vote by term (from Table 4, but with 
observations for terms 0 and 1 based on open seat winners only). Overlaid with 
observed change is the accumulation of the net spending advantage, assuming 
spending effects persist over time without decay. The gap between the two trend 
lines represents the presumed incumbent advantage from sources other than 
spending. The close fit between the two curves suggests the intriguing conjec-
ture that net spending might account for all except for roughly four percentage 
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TABLE 5 
Spending and Estimated Spending Effects, by Number of Terms, 
Assuming t-.1 = .395, Ac= .282 
Estimated 
Log Log Mean Net 
Incumbent Spending* Challenger Spending* Spending Effect 
Term N IE f31 (tjJ!) CE f3c (tf3c} f31IE + f3cCE 
0 (404) 3.6la 4.70b (12.80) 3.ooc -4.70b (-12.80) 2.33d 
(432) 3.41 e 4.51 (5.61) 2.14e -3.99 (-12.03) 6.84 
2 (386) 3.32 2.23 (3.47) 2.00 -3.48 (-10.89) 0.06 
3 (319) 3.28 1.05 (1.42) 1.88 -2.88 (-8.56) -2.10 
4 (253) 3.31 2.33 (2.64) 1.90 -3.26 (-7.87) 1.42 
5 (202) 3.25 1.12 (1.61) 1.74 -2.71 (-7.65) -1.27 
6 (174) 3.22 1.65 (1.96) 1.74 -3.16 (-7.07) -0.38 
7 (146) 3.21 0.46 (0.52) 1.65 -2.15 (-4.27) -2.10 
8 (115) 3.10 0.90 (1.06) 1.41 -3.04 (-6.49) -1.69 
9 (80) 3.19 1.24 (0.98) 1.48 -3.37 (-5.52) -1.90 
10 (59) 2.97 0.63 (0.48) 1.32 -2.04 (-2.58) -1.70 
aMean spending as first-time winner 
bOLS estimates, jJ's constrained to be equal 
cFirst-time winners' mean opponent spending 
dEstimated mean contribution of spending to first-time victory 
eOpen seat winners only 
*Log spending= (log of spending - $5,000) - log ($5 ,000) 
points of the incumbency advantage, and this is nearly constant over the entire 
career. 11 
Conclusions 
Our results lead to two basic conclusions. The first is that we provide strong 
evidence on the debate about the effect of current incumbent spending on in-
cumbent vote in the current election year. Our statistical evidence shows very 
11 Several directions are possible for a more general treatment of the estimation of the spending 
components of the incumbency advantage. The most obvious would be to allow some decay in the 
effect of current spending on future elections. We have assumed that the spending advantage gener-
ated by the current election carries over 100% into future elections. That is, to the extent that 
differential spending in the current campaign may have affected voters' impressions about the desir-
ability of the incumbent, this effect is permanent rather than transitory. An alternative model would 
assume a transitory component to the spending effects of the current campaign, since some aspects 
of the campaign are really specific to the current challenger and will be ignored by voters in future 
elections. We might also assume that the effects of challenger spending decay more readily than do 
the effects of incumbent spending, since much of challenger spending is simply geared toward name 
recognition. 
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FIGURE 1 
Net Vote and Cumulative Spending Effects over Congressional Careers 
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clearly that current incumbent spending matters, and that the effect of this spend-
ing varies systematically over the career, beginning as a very strong effect and 
eventually declining with seniority. A methodological innovation of our analysis 
is identification of the spending and vote equations by imposing covariance re-
strictions on the matrix of residuals. This "uncorrelated errors" assumption 
simply means that the correlations between the spending variables and the vote 
are the result of variables in the model and not omitted variables. 
The second, most important conclusion of this paper goes more deeply to the 
mechanism by which spending helps incumbents. In particular, we present evi-
dence that incumbent spending has a long-term effect on incumbent success. 
That is, current spending not only helps an incumbent in the current election, but 
has a persistence to it, which makes it a major factor contributing to the oft-
noted advantage of incumbency in congressional elections. This is a much 
different view from the standard one, which focuses only on the short-term ef-
fects of spending in the current election. Besides being plausible on theoretical 
grounds, the cumulative effects of spending that we estimate also produce a very 
close empirical match with the time profile of incumbency advantage, as mea-
sured by how well incumbents of different seniorities outperform expectations 
(our "Par" measure). 
Summarizing, incumbent spending is a major contributing factor to the in-
cumbency advantage. We see incumbents' spending advantage as a cumulative 
process. Among nonincumbent candidates, the strongest are able to spend more, 
enhancing their chances of victory, so that newly elected house members' repu-
tations are already enhanced by their spending in their first successful race. They 
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accumulate a sophomore surge by again outspending their opponents and spend-
ing more effectively during their first reelection race. Throughout the career, this 
spending advantage accumulates with diminishing rates of return. With time, in-
cumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending, but challengers face 
two special burdens: they generally raise and spend less cash than the incum-
bents they are trying to unseat, and they must combat the incumbent's positive 
reputation built in large part by past spending. When the incumbent is electorally 
weakened, however, challengers enjoy two advantages of their own: weakened, 
senior incumbents gain little by new spending, and credible challengers can 
spend competitively. 
Manuscript submitted 14 October 1996 
Final manuscript received 1 September 1997 
References 
Abramowitz, Alan I. 1991. "Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in 
U.S. House Elections." Journal of Politics 53:34-56. 
Alford, John, and David Brady. 1993. "Personal and Partisan Advantages in U.S. Congressional Elec-
tions, 1846-1990." In Congress Reconsidered, ed. L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer. 5th ed. 
Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Bartels, Larry. 1992. "Instruments and 'Quasi-Instrumental' Variables." In Political Analysis, V<Jl. 2, 
ed. James Stimson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Erikson, Robert S. 1972. "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional 
Elections." American Political Science Review 66:1234-45. 
Erikson, Robert S. 1982. "The 'Uncorrelated Errors' Approach to the Problem of Causal Feedback." 
Journal of Politics 44:863-81. 
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1993. "The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incum-
bency in Congressional Elections." California Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 851. 
Fisher, Franklin M. 1966. The Identification Problem in Econometrics. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating Incumbency Advantge without Bias." American 
Journal of Political Science 34: 1142-64. 
Goidel, Robert K., and Donald A. Gross. 1994. "A Systems Approach to Campaign Finance in House 
Elections." American Politics Quarterly 22:125-51. 
Goldberger, Arthur S. 1991. A Course in Econometrics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Green, Donald P., and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reesti-
mating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections." American Journal of Political 
Science 32:884-907. 
Green, Donald P., and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1990. "Rebuttal to Jacobson's 'New Evidence for Old Ar-
guments.'" American Journal of Political Science 34:363-72. 
Hanushek, Eric A., and John E. Jackson. 1977. Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Hausman J. A., W. K. Newey, and W. E. Taylor. 1987. "Efficient Estimation and Identification of Si-
multaneous Equation Models with Covariance Restrictions." Econometrica 55:849-74. 
Hausman, J. A., and W. E. Taylor. 1983. "Identification in Linear Simultaneous Equation Systems 
with Covariance Restrictions: An Instrumental Variables Interpretation." Econometrica 
51:1527-49. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 03 Mar 2016 19:51:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Campaign Spending and Incumbency 373 
Heise, David B. 1975. Causal Analysis. New York: Wiley. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." American 
Political Science Review 72 :469-91. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1985. "Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections, 1972-1982." 
Public Choice 7:7-62. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. 'The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for 
Old Arguments." American Journal of Political Science 34:334-62. 
Johnston, J. 1963. Econometric Methods New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Kenny, Christopher, and Michael McBurnette. 1994. "An Individual-Level Multiequation Model of 
Expenditure Effects in Contested Electons." American Political Science Review 88:699-707. 
Levitt, Steven D. 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on 
Election Outcomes in the U.S. House." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102:777-98. 
Maddala, G. S. 1977. Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Malinvaud, E. 1966. Statistical Methods of Econometrics. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Rothenberg, Thomas S. 1973. Efficient Estimation with A Priori Information. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 
Robert S. Erikson is a Dr. Kenneth L. Fay Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Houston, Houston TX 77204-3474. 
Thomas Palfry is a professor of economics and political science at the 
California Institute of Technology, in Pasadena, CA 91125. 
